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Abstract: The study examines the demand for corruption in Nigeria between 1991 and 2018. While there exist a vast 
number of literatures on the impact of corruption on several socioeconomic indicators, this study adds to the scanty 
existing literature on the demand for corruption from the Nigerian perspective. Applying the Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Model (ARDL) estimation technique, findings show that both in the shortrun and long run, there exist a positive 
relationship between income levels, income inequality, unemployment rate and the demand for corruption in Nigeria. 
Also a negative relationship between poverty and the demand for corruption was found to exist both in the short and 
long run. Notably, income levels were found to significantly influence the demand for corruption in Nigeria both in the 
short and long run. The implication of the finding suggests that since higher income levels imply higher demand for 
corruption in Nigeria, government can reduce the demand for corruption by reducing income inequality through wealth 
redistribution measures.   
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1. Introduction 
Nigeria is bedeviled by myriads of problems ranging from crime and terrorism, poverty, unemployment 
to corruption. However, of all these problems, the issue of corruption is most precarious especially due 
to its devastating impact on development. In this twenty-first century, corruption is one of the 
developmental problems faced by many developing economy including Nigeria (Nye, 1967). According 
to Emaikwu (2011) this problem is one of the greatest challenge mitigating against the progress of the 
country and has continued to increase year-over-year.  
Demand for corruption is as old as the existence of man (Kaufman, 1997). It exists in the public and 
private sectors of governments, profit and non-profit organizations, religious organizations as well as 
charitable organizations. From a historic point of view, demand for corruption in Nigeria was heavily 
concentrated in the political system of the country even before independence and the activities of 
Nigerian nationalist (Ogbeidi, 2012). During the colonial era, corruption manifested in the form of 
Nigerians being bribed with different foreign goods in exchange for local products such as slaves and 
from then up until now, various regimes have been fraught with diverse corrupt practices. For instance, 
with the creation of modern public administration in the country several cases of official misuse of 
resources and funds have been recorded. Two major events argued to have festered the high demand in 
corruption have been identified to be the discovery of crude oil and the rise of public administration. A 
prominent case in point is the 2012 corruption case of the Nigerian petroleum industry. During this 
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period, the federal government of Nigeria inaugurated a 17-member task force team to probe the 
petroleum industry. Reports from their investigation revealed that Nigeria had lost tens of billions of 
dollars in oil and gas revenues over the last decade from cut-price deals struck between multinational 
oil companies and government officials. Ijewereme (2015) however averred that this disclosure provides 
new evidence of Nigeria's long history of corruption which has enriched its elite and their cronies in the 
oil industry while two thirds of the people still languish in abject poverty.  Additionally, other 
conspicuous cases of corruption include; the police pension fund fraud, kerosene subsidy scam, ₦195 
billion Maina pension scam, Stella Oduah car purchase scandal, Mohammed Abacha ₦446 billion case, 
crude oil theft scandal and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) missing ₦20 billion 
case among others (Ijewereme, 2015; Eme, Uche & Uche 2014; and Anaedozie, 2017).   
The high demand for corruption in the country necessitated the establishment of two anticorruption 
agencies mandated to check the spread of this menace. These agencies include, the Economics and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC). They are essentially responsible for penalizing offenders and curbing 
corrupt practices at all levels. Dismally, despite the inauguration of these institutions, no tangible result 
has been achieved. Similarly, Odekunle (2006) observed that, the level of corruption in Nigeria is at an 
endemic state and in spite of various measures undertaken to stem its spread, it has remained unabated. 
It is found in all sectors of society, ranging from the big sector to the small sector. More so, Mbaku 
(1996) asserted that the system has deteriorated such that corruption is used to check corruption by 
corrupting the system all the more thereby making the demand for corruption very high in Nigeria. In 
the same vein, Moyosore (2015) observed that, efforts channeled towards addressing this siege have 
always met with frustration due to the constant emergence of newer and more sophisticated ways to 
engage in corrupt practices.  
Various studies have examined the impact of corruption on socio-economic indicators and development 
variables such as economic growth, economic development, unemployment and poverty. Some of this 
studies include the investigations of Onchari (2019), Negin, Abd Rashid & Nikopour (2010), Donwa, 
Mgbame & Ogbeide (2015), Khagram (2005) and (Nwabuzor, 2005). However, the question as to what 
triggers the demand for corrupt practices particularly in Nigeria have not received sufficient attention 
and as such remained under-investigated. A major detriment of corruption is that it impedes growth and 
development and also reduces a nation’s capacity to expel poverty (Elliot, 1997; Urien, 2012; and 
Ogbeidi, 2012). Given the pernicious effect of corruption, it is a problem whose solution cannot be put 
at a later date and therefore demands urgent policy action. 
This study therefore seeks to fill this identified gap and contribute to the frontier of knowledge by 
empirically identifying the causes of the demand for corruption in Nigeria and suggesting plausible ways 
in which this demand can be controlled. 
This study is structured into five sections: following this introductory section, Section 2 presents the 
review of previous literatures. Section 3 describes dataset adopted for the study and methodology, 
section 4 presents the analysis of results and discussion while Section 5 concludes with policy 
recommendations and direction for future work. 
  
   
E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 2(38)/2019                                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
45 
2  Review of Previous Literatures 
2.1 The Concept of Corruption 
There is no well-defined and universally acceptable definition for corruption. However, various labels 
have been adopted by different scholars to describe corruption and the typology of corruption in Nigeria. 
Obayelu (2007) identified some of these labels to include bribery, extortion (money and other resources 
extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threat), embezzlement (theft of public resources by public 
officials), financial malpractice, egunje, dash, brown envelops, tips, gratification, emoluments, greasing, 
inducement, payments under the table and sub-payments, softening the ground, side payments, irregular 
payments, undocumented extra-payments, facilitation payments, mobilizations fees, routine 
governmental action, revised estimates, padded contract, over/under invoicing, cash commission, 
kickback, payoff, convert exchanges, shady deals and cover-ups. In addition to these labels, Umo (1993) 
identified grafts, negligence and smuggling to be included. 
From the above description, it is evident that the concept of corruption is very complex, attracting 
different views and approaches as to what properly constitutes corruption. According to Nye’s (1967) 
corruption is any behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public servant (appointive or 
elective) as a result of private interest regarding wealth, status or gains. Webster (1974) describes 
corruption as the impairment of virtue, integrity or moral principle. However, the usage of the term 
‘impairment’ in the definition may be misconstrued as a harm, injury or inability that is beyond the 
control of an individual, a sense that undermines the act of corruption. Nonetheless, this definition allows 
us to admit a range of morally offensive and criminal behavior as acts of corruption. To Macrae (1982), 
corruption is the misappropriation of resources meant for the public to cater for personal ends. This 
description aptly fits public sector corruption. It illustrates corruption as the collection of bribes by 
public officials for the issuance visas or passports, licenses or permits, authorization for the passage of 
goods at the air/sea port and the enactment of regulations aimed at creating artificial scarcity.  
According to Asian Development Bank, corruption refers to the behaviors of private and public officers 
who unlawfully and improperly enrich themselves and/or those who are closely related to them, or 
induce others to engage in corrupt practices, by misusing the position in which they are placed (Agbu, 
2003). Rose-Ackerman (1999) lamented that corruption exists because institutions established with the 
objective of regulating interrelationship between the citizens and the states are used instead for personal 
enrichment and provision of benefits to the corrupt.  
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is not no agreement as to what corruption exactly means, 
however, one similarity among these numerous definitions is the unlawful use of funds or position which 
should have been utilized for the benefit of the society as a whole.  
 
2.2 Empirical Review of Literature 
Demand for corruption can be seen as the amount of corrupt activities required by an individual or 
government officials. Khagram (2005) observed a link between corruption and poverty while Theobald 
(2002) asserted that global poverty may be the most important reason for international corruption. 
According to this study, many public officials may be motivated to demand for corruption, because they 
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are apparent victim of poverty. These public officials may therefore result to corrupt practices in order 
to provide basic needs of housing and food for themselves and their dependents. Similarly, Hotchkiss 
(1998) argued that due to poverty and low wage earnings relative to high cost of living, individuals may 
be compelled to demand for corruption.  
Eras (2003) found a link between corruption and freedom. The study emphasized that economic freedom 
comprises of factors such as wages and prices, trade, government intervention, monetary policy and the 
informal economy size. This freedom however, is often thwarted by the policies adopted by government 
especially policies aimed at imposing strict economic constraints. This lead to the creation of lost 
economic freedom which in turn creates room for more corrupt practices. The increase in the level of 
corruption damages the people’s faith in government which erodes structures and economic capacities 
(Nwabuzor, 2005). Additionally, the study of Sanyal & Saman (2004) observed that economic freedom 
also impacts the demand for corruption in developing countries. Two major findings from their study 
are; One, economic factors that supports controlled government intervention, market forces, rule based 
system and good public finance are less likely to encourage corruption. Two, encouraging economic 
policies that supports open economy rather than closed economy will largely reduce the incidences of 
corruption. 
Furthermore, another strand of literature observed a link between ethnic polarization and corruption. 
Easterly & Levine (1997) argued that divided societies fosters competition among the various ethnic 
groups which aggravates political patronage and bureaucratic predation. They further argued that 
demand for corruption in deeply divided societies may be higher at any given price. For instance 
members of the same ethnic group may feel that the only way to obtain government services is to demand 
favours from their co-ethnic members in the offices. On the other hand, the supply of corrupt services 
may be increased by the social leverage that ethnic leaders have over officials of their ethnicity and as 
such may be reluctant to refuse the demand of their co-ethnic members.  
Bliss & Di Tella (1997) conversely, contended that corruption will always have to do with power at all 
levels. Power at all levels is the ability of a party to be able to control the behavior of the other party. 
Robbins (2000) buttressed this assertion by explaining how that withholding or offering something of 
value to a dependent party can be used as a means to control the behavior of the dependent party. 
According to the study there exist a measure of power both in the hands of a bribe taker and a bribe 
giver, and therefore both those who demand and those who supply bribe possess some degree of power 
over the other.  
To Harrison (2000) and Landes (2000) culture is a primary determinant of corruption and culture partly 
account for the diverse philosophy and varying attitudes of people (Huntington, 2000). According to 
these authors, the demand for corruption may be influenced by people’s cultural value systems which 
may endorse, rather than condemn the act of corruption. Also, they observed that the existing social 
structures of some nations may fuel the propensity to resort to corrupt practices so as to achieve the 
socially approved goals. Maingot, (1994), Izraeli (1997) and Khera (2001) further found that in some 
cultures, even at the expense of ethics, family favourism and nepotism are integral part of their business 
transactions.  
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The study of Werlin’s (2002) maintained that the extreme weakness of governance in many nation is 
the reason for the high demand for corruption in those countries. The study debated that in some 
countries, government officials may accept bribes because there are no stringent measures that prevents 
them from doing so. Possible reasons provided for the absence of these measures include poverty of a 
nation, system of government and unsophisticated legal system. On the other hand, Beets (2005) 
contested that lack of education or poor quality education explains the demand for corruption by a public 
official. According to the study, with little education it might only be possible to comprehend only the 
short term personal gains from corruption without comprehending the global implications of corruption. 
 
3 Description of Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
The variables used for this study are Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Real Gross Domestic Product 
Per Capita (RGDPC), Inequality gap (GINI), Poverty rate (NPI) and Unemployment rate (UNR). 
RGDPC is a deflated measure for real income per capita which is a measure for standard of living.  
Corruption Perception index (CPI) captures the demand for corruption. It is an index that ranks countries 
based on her perceived level of public sector corruption. The higher the CPI, the higher a country’s 
demand for corruption. 
Inequality gap is proxy by income inequality index. Inequality adversely affect the social norms about 
corruption (as an acceptable behaviour) and the beliefs of the people about the validity of rules and 
institutions (Jong-sung & Khagram, 2015). Also, the rich most often times have wider range of 
opportunities and greater motivation to engage in corrupt practices than the poor who are more 
vulnerable to extortion. Corruption widen inequality gap and as this gap widen it becomes increasingly 
difficult to monitor and hold the powerful and rich accountable. The higher inequality is the greater will 
be the demand for corruption and vice versa. Poverty rate (NPI) and Unemployment rate (UNR) are also 
contributory factors to the demand for corruption. As observed by Birdsall (1998) reduction of 
unemployment and the provision of cheap and affordable public services to the poor will reduce 
inequality, particularly income inequality which severely induces the demand for corruption. For 
instance, the unemployed will feel more obliged to engage in corrupt practices in the process of seeking 
for a job especially when the remuneration is very attractive. 
3.2 Data Sources  
The study utilized annual data ranging from 1991 to 2018 for the study period of 28 years. Data utilized 
for this study were sourced from publications of the Transparency International, National Bureau of 
statistics (NBS), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and other published articles and text books.   
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical underpinning for this study stems from the economic concept of demand, the Constant 
Elasticity Demand function and the Nerlove’s demand function.  Generally, demand is the amount of 
good or service a consumer is willing and able to purchase at a given period. Demand for a good or 
service is determined by many different factors but chiefly its price. In few extreme cases, demand may 
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be completely unrelated to price. Empirical evidence has proven on many occasions that quantity 
demanded is influenced by other factors such as market behavior (instead of individual consumer), 
multivariate functions instead of singular function (price) or few variable model, and simultaneous 
variation of multiple independent variables instead of holding other factors constant (Kyarem, 2010). 
The Constant Elasticity Demand (CED) function proposes the demand for a product (𝑄𝑥) as a function 
of its price (𝑃𝑥), the consumer’s income (Y) and the prices of substitutes or complements (𝑃𝑜). It assumes 
the coefficient of all the variables relevant to the demand function are elasticities of demand of each of 
the independent variables and are expected to remain constant.  
Its general form is stated as: 
𝑄𝑥 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑥 , 𝑃𝑜, 𝑌)           (1) 
Functionally, 𝑄𝑥= 𝐵𝑜+𝑃𝑥
𝑏 + 𝑃𝑜
𝑐+𝑌𝑑        (2)  
Where 𝐵0= exogenous variables, b, c and d = coefficient and price elasticities of demand 
By this postulation, there is no money illusion which is fallacious in a globalized world that classifies 
men as billionaires/millionaires disregarding inflationary tendencies across national boundaries. 
Also pragmatism has proven that the general demand function is overstressed when cases of consumer 
durables like transistor radios and non-durables like foodstuff or body creams are subjected to the 
quantity-price relationship, while the latter is purchased and consumed once in a period, the former is 
the reverse. Hence the Nerlove’s demand function defines the current demand function for consumer 
durables (𝐷𝑑𝑐) as 
𝐷𝑑𝑐=f (𝑌𝑐 + 𝐷𝑐−1)          (3) 
Where 𝐷𝑑𝑐 = current consumption of durable goods, 𝑌𝑐= income consumers and 𝐷𝑐−1= previous 
consumption of the durable good. In explicit mathematical form, 
𝐷𝑑𝑐=𝑎1𝑌𝑐 − 𝑎2𝐷𝑐−1          (4)  
𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are the coefficients to be estimated and the a priori signs 𝐷𝑐−1 < 0 and 𝑌𝑐 < 0. 
In this paper we take corruption as a durable consumer good, hence demand for corruption 𝐷𝑐 is 
dependent on the level of income of individual𝑠 𝑌𝑖; degree of Inequality, 𝐸𝑖; the level Poverty, 𝑃𝑖; and 
rate of unemployment 𝑁𝑐. The general form is 
𝐷𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖,𝑁𝑐,)          (5) 
While the structural form is 
Dc= β + 𝑎1𝑃𝑖+ 𝑎2𝑁𝑐 +  𝑎3𝐸𝑖 −  𝑎4𝑌𝑐         (6) 
Whether viewed as a normal commodity, a commodity with constant elasticity or as a durable consumer 
good, the Nerlove and CES frameworked the analysis.  
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3.4 Model Specification 
The model captures the dependent variable which is the demand for corruption captured by Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI). The independent variables include; Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
(RGDPC) represented by income level, Inequality gap measured by Gini coefficient (GINI), National 
Poverty Index captured by Poverty rate (NPI) and Unemployment rate (UNR). Functionally, equation 
(5) can be re-written as; 
CPI = f (RGDPC, GINI, NPI, UNR)        (7) 
In linear econometric form, equation (7) becomes:  
CPI= αo + α1 RGDPC + α2 GINI + α3 NPI + α4UNR + Ԑt     (8) 
equation (8) can be further written as; 
LCPI= αo +α1 LRGDPC + α2 LGINI + α3 LNPI + α4UNR + Ԑt     (9) 
Where;  
CPI represents corruption perception index,  
RGDPC represents income (real gross domestic product per capita), 
NPI is the poverty rate (National Poverty Index) 
GINI is the Inequality gap (Gini Coefficient) 
and Ԑt is the disturbance term.  
The presumptive signs of the variables are; 𝛼1< 0, 𝛼3 >/< 0, 𝛼2, 𝛼4> 0  
Using this model, the objective will be evaluated using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model 
as its empirical framework for two primary reasons: First, under the ARDL model, provision is made 
for both the dynamic and static effect(s) of the exogenous variable(s) on the endogenous variable. 
Second, ARDL framework offers a technique in checking for the existence of a long-run relationship 
between variables, which is referred to as the Bounds test. Bounds test is flexible as it accommodates 
both stationary and differenced stationary series which makes it superior to other cointegration test such 
as, Engle-Granger and Johansen tests, which considers only differenced stationary series integrated of 
the same order.  
Thus, the ARDL model of the specification in equation (9) is: 
∆LCPI= αo + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  ∆LRGDPC + ∑ 𝛼2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  ∆LGINI + ∑ 𝛼3𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆LNPI + ∑ 𝛼4𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆UNR +Ԑt    (10) 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
In this section the data for all the variables utilized throughout the study is described with particular 
reference to the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation. This result is presented in 
Table 1 below. From the table, the series with the highest mean value is RGDPC while the series with 
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the lowest mean value is UNR. In terms of standard deviation, the most volatile is RGDPC while the 
least volatile is UNR. 
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
RGDPC 281593.5 385349.0 202704.0 68375.68 274232.8 
CPI 20.75623 28.00000 6.900000 6.240072 22.00000 
GINI 46.17321 56.00000 39.00000 4.677754 45.40000 
UNR 4.143571 6.237000 3.424000 0.772194 3.952500 
NPI 56.93286 66.90000 50.00000 4.604647 55.50500 
Source: Authors’ computation from Eviews 9 
4.2 Stationary Test Result  
To ascertain that the data series utilized in this study properly satisfies that stationarity conditions and 
that the results obtain are not spurious, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was conducted. This 
section presents the results of the ADF unit root tests with and without constant and trend.  
Table 2. Unit Root Test Result 
Variable Level@ First 
Difference@ 
Level@@ First 
Difference@@ 
First 
Difference 
Remark 
LRGDPC 0.8371 0.1531 0.1566 0.4004 0.0287** I(1) 
LCPI 0.0237**  0.0101**   I(0) 
LGINI 0.3325 0.2813 0.3562 0.5302 0.0347** I(1) 
UNR 0.6330 0.0571** 0.7136 0.0524** 0.0072*** I(1) 
LNPI 0.1469 0.0002*** 0.1944 0.0010*** -5.6208*** I(1) 
@ (@@)) denotes unit root with constant and (with constant and trend) respectively 
*** (**) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1% (5%) level respectively 
Source: Authors’ Computation from Eviews 9 
The ADF test result presented above shows that for all our variables except CPI, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of unit root. Hence, we differenced the non-stationary variables and re-apply the unit 
root test to confirm the stationarity of the variables at either 1% or 5% level of significance. However, 
due to the fact that some of these variables were not stationary at levels but at first difference, we proceed 
to test for the existence of cointegration in the variable.  
4.3 Cointegration Test Result 
Since the result of the conventional unit root test (ADF) shows that the series used in this study are either 
I(0) and I(1), the consideration of Bounds cointegration test is plausible. This section therefore presents 
and interprets the result of the Bounds integration test for the model in Table 3 below.  
Table 3. Result of ARDL Bounds Test for Cointegration 
 Computed Wald (F-statistic): 7.7564 
 0.10 0.05 0.01 
K=4 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
F*          2.45          3.52          2.86            4.01          3.74           
5.06 
k represents number of regressors in the ARDL model, while F-statistic with unrestricted intercept with no trend 
Source: Authors’ computation 
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The above Bounds test for cointegration, shows the existence of cointegration among the variables since 
their associated F-stats jointly falls above the I(1) critical value bounds at all 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance. Hence, having found a long run relationship among the variables, the ARDL estimate of 
the long run and short run parameter will be estimated next. However, before the estimation of the 
ARDL model, the optimum lag length for the model is determined from the lag length criteria. We relied 
upon the information provided by the lag length selection criteria presented in Table 4 to select the 
optimum lag length for the estimation. 
Table 4. Result of the Lag Length Criteria 
LAG LOGL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  17.63342 NA*  0.015685 -1.329833 -1.081297 -1.287771 
1  19.82502  2.999028   0.013971* -1.455265  -1.157021*  -1.404790* 
2  20.84264  1.285417  0.014141  -1.457120* -1.109169 -1.398233 
3  21.15403  0.360560  0.015504 -1.384635 -0.986976 -1.317335 
4  22.77758  1.709004  0.014907 -1.450272 -1.002906 -1.374560 
* represent order of lag length selected by criterion 
Source: Authors’ computation 
From Table 4 above, majority of the lag length selection criterion suggested 1 period lag except Akaike 
information criteria (AIC). Therefore, this study therefore employs 1 period lag for the ARDL 
estimation.    
4.4 Regression Result and Discussion 
Table 4. Longrun and Shortrun Estimates 
Panel A: Long run Estimates 
Dependent Variable: CPI 
Independent Variables Coefficient  Standard Error T-Statistic (Probability) 
C -8.2043 4.9505 -1.6573 (0.1169) 
LGINI 0.7653 0.6600 1.1595 (0.2633) 
LRGDPC 1.0227 0.2395 4.2708 (0.0006) 
LNPI -1.1385 0.9395 -1.2118 (0.2432) 
UNR 0.0074 0.0504 0.1462 (0.8855) 
Panel B: Short run Estimates 
Dependent Variable: CPI 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  Standard Error T-Statistic (Probability) 
LGINI 0.7375 0.6870 1.0734 (0.2990) 
LRGDPC 0.9855 0.3184 3.0955 (0.0069) 
LNPI -1.0971 0.9648 -1.1372 (0.2722) 
UNR 0.0071 0.0486 0.1461 (0.8856) 
ECT(-1) -0.9636 0.1807 -5.3340 (0.0001) 
Diagnostic Tests 
Adj. R2 = 0.7015, F-Statistic = 10.8665(0.0001), BG X2= 1.0201(0.3859), SR= 0.1624, JB[X2 (2)] =1.0355 (0.5959), 
RESET=0.1976 (0.6630) 
Probability values are in Brackets 
Adjusted R2: Goodness of fit for the model  
BG: Breusch Godfrey LM test for Serial Correlation 
RESET: Ramseys regression equation specification error test. 
JB: Jaque Bera test for normality of residuals 
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SR: Standard Error of regression 
Source: Author’s computation from Eviews 9 
 
4.4.1 Long run Estimates  
The results for the estimated demand for corruption function is presented in Table 4 above. Panel A 
presents the long run estimates while panel B presents the short run estimates. The long run estimate 
results show that inequality gap, unemployment level and poverty rate coefficients all conforms to 
economic a priori expectation except for the coefficient of income level. The sign of the coefficient of 
GINI is positive but insignificant in the long run. This implies that the demand for corruption increases 
as inequality gap increases. From Table 4, 1 percent increase in current inequality gap will lead to 0.7653 
percent increase in the demand for corruption in Nigeria.  This results tallies with the findings of Karstedt 
(2001) who observed that countries with high income inequality have high level of corruption.  
RGDPC is positively signed which is inconsistent with a priori expectation although statistically 
signification. The coefficient of 1.0227 shows that, the demand for corruption will rise by 1.0227 percent 
if the current level of income rises by 1 percent. The explanation for this nonconformity can be explained 
by the peculiarity of corruption in Nigeria. Apart from the fact that the Nigerian system finds it difficult 
to apprehend the rich and powerful for engaging in corrupt practices, the assertion of Jong-sung and 
Khagram (2015), on wider range of opportunities and greater motivation to engage in corrupt practices 
by the rich aligns with this result. Additionally, some incidences in Nigeria buttresses this argument that 
high income level does not insure against the demand for corruption. Two of such incidence is the 2009 
Cecilia Ibru multi-billion money laundering scandal and the Ndidi Okereke money laundering scandal 
who were both high income earners. The former was charged with a case of money laundering of about 
15 billion naira and 120 related offenses. She pleaded guilty to 3 of the 25-count charge against her and 
was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment as well as the forfeiture of over 191 billion naira in cash and 
asset management. Similarly, the latter was accused of misappropriation of funds (about 1.5 billion 
naira) and fraudulent transactions which almost led to the collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
market in 2009. 
UNR has a positively insignificant relationship with CPI and 1 percent increase in UNR will lead to 
approximately 0.7400 percent increase in the demand for corruption. This result is in line with the study 
of Bayart et al., (1997) who found that in the presence of high unemployment, the tendency to give out 
money in order to gain “special” favours and advantage in their struggle to get employed is done in 
many ways. Conversely, NPI has a negative relationship with CPI implying that the more poverty level 
rises the lower the demand for corruption. Explicitly, 1 percent increase in the current poverty rate will 
lead to 1.1385 percent decline in the demand for corruption. This result again tallies with the contention 
of Jong-sung and Khagram (2015) that the poor do not have wide range of opportunities and motivation 
to engage in corrupt practices. Additionally, the peculiarity and incidences of corruption in Nigeria in 
which majority of the profound cases have been found among the rich and powerful, possibly provides 
an explanation for the outcome of this finding. 
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4.4.2 Short run Estimates 
Similarly, the results of the estimated short run parameters are presented in panel B of Table 4. All the 
coefficient of the explanatory variables were correctly signed except RGDPC. It is interesting to mention 
that the signs of the short run parameter coefficients is analogous to those of the long run estimate.  
In the short run, GINI, UNR and RGDPC all have positive relationship with CPI while NPI has a 
negative relationship with CPI.  Although only the RGDPC coefficient significantly affects CPI. 
From Table 4, 1 percent increase in GINI will increase the demand for corruption  by 0.7375 percent in 
the short run and 1 percent increase in RGDPC will also increase the demand for corruption by 0.9855 
percent at 1 percent level of significance. This implies that increase in inequality gap increases the 
demand for corruption in Nigeria although not significantly. This finding tallies with the outcome of 
Glaeser, Scheinkman & Sheifer (2003). Possible reasons for this result has been provided in previous 
sections.  
UNR has positively insignificant relationship with CPI and 1 percent increase in UNR will lead to 
approximately 0.071 percent increase in the demand for corruption. Conversely, NPI has a negative 
relationship with CPI. This implies that the more poverty level rises the lower will be the demand for 
corruption. That is, 1 percent increase in the current poverty rate will lead to 1.0971 percent increase in 
the demand for corruption. 
The error correction term (ECT) is negative (-0.96) and statistically significant at 1 percent level of 
significance. This further lends credence to the cointegration among variables under investigation. The 
feedback coefficient of -0.96 suggest that about 96 percent of disequilibrium is corrected in the current 
year. The speed of adjustment is thus very high. Overall the results indicates that in the short run, changes 
in the explanatory variables in the estimated model impacts the demand for corruption in Nigeria.  
4.4.3  Diagnostic Test 
This section interprets the result of the post-estimation/diagnostic tests conducted on the estimated 
model presented in Table 4. It is observed from the table that the estimated model fails to reject the null 
hypotheses of normality of the residuals, no misspecification error and no serial correlation in the 
residuals among others since the reported probabilities are greater than 10 percent level of significance 
in all cases. Therefore the model can be concluded to be adequate for policy prescription and appropriate 
decision making. 
Explicitly, the F-statistic value of 10.8665 indicates the overall statistical significance of the model at 1 
percent level of significance as shown by the P-value of 0.0001. Thus, all the explanatory variables used 
in the model simultaneously explains the variation on the demand for corruption in Nigeria. The 
Adjusted R2 is 0.70 which implies that about 70 percent of the variation in the demand for corruption in 
Nigeria has been explained by the exogenous variables. Conversely, the goodness of fit of the estimated 
model measured by the adjusted coefficient of determination has high predictive capability. The Jaque-
Bera test statistic for normality is 1.0355 with associated probability-value of 0.5959 implying that the 
null hypothesis of normally distributed error term cannot be rejected. The Ramseys regression equation 
specification error test is statistically insignificant, which confirms the acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of no misspecification. 
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5  Policy Recommendation and Direction for Future Work 
The destructive impact of corruption has continued to have negative impact on the socioeconomic 
performance of Nigeria’s economy. One way plausible way to control the spread of this menace is to 
reduce the demand for it. While there exist a vast number of studies on the impact of corruption on 
economic growth and development, there are very few literatures on the demand for corruption 
particularly in Nigeria. Findings from this study revealed that a key trigger of the demand for corruption 
in Nigeria both in the short and long run is income level measured by per capita income. Also income 
inequality gap, and unemployment rate were both found to have a positive relationship with the demand 
for corruption, while poverty level had a negative relationship with the demand for corruption both in 
the short and long run.  
The findings from this investigation therefore suggest that increasing income levels will translate into 
higher demand for corruption. In order words, the higher the income level the greater the opportunities 
and motivation to demand for corruption in Nigeria. The government should control this tendency by 
reducing the income inequality gap through wealth redistribution. A possible mechanism through which 
wealth can be redistributed is through the operation of a progressive tax system. However, in the process 
of wealth redistribution it is important for the government to strongly put into consideration the degree 
of responsiveness of the demand for corruption to poverty and inequality. The reason is that, the degree 
of the responsiveness of the demand for corruption to wealth redistribution especially on the poor must 
be carefully observed in order to determine the optimum point at which further wealth redistribution 
will begin to induce the demand for corruption. Consequently, the aforementioned indicates an area for 
further work. In addition, this results further confirms the argument that majority of the cases of 
corruption in Nigeria is found among the rich and powerful who have more opportunities to engage in 
corrupt practices and exploit loopholes in the system. This tendency should be controlled by enforcing 
policies that empowering institutions responsible for handling cases of corruption in Nigeria. 
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